The Kenya little general election: a study in problems of urban political integration by Harbeson, John, W.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative C o m m o n s Attr ibut ion-NonCommercial -
NoDerivs 3 . 0 Licence. 
T o view a copy of the licence please see: 
http ://creat ivecommons.0rg/l icenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 

The Kenya Little General Election: A Study in 
• ' Problems of Urban Political Integration 
i 
John N. Harbeson 
This paper deals with some problems of achieving.political 
integration in two Kenya cities as reflected in the background, issues, 
IT 
and conduct of the Little General Election, 1966 . The election was 
"little11 because it affected only twenty-nine members of Parliament 
out of 169, forced by a new constitutional amendment to seek re-election 
after they left the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). Their • 
departure to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU) posed a challenge-to 
KANU's efforts at achieving political integration. Since Independence, 
KANU has made a notable effort to unite people of all races, tribes, 
political backgrounds, and economic fortunes in the common task of 
nation building. This paper will focus on the unsuccessful attempts of 
a dissident MP in Nairobi and one in Nakuru to-retain their seats against 
new KANU candidates, from the standpoint of urban problems of political 
integration. 
The election contests in the urban constituencies of Nakuru 
and Nairobi East demonstrated the essential ambiguity of the Little 
General Election as a whole, for the opposition Kenya People's Union 
campaigned in protest against alleged broken promises by the KANU 
Government but could not campaign as an alternative to its rule. 
Although KANU did not put great stress on this fact,it is a reasonable 
hypothesis even in the absence of a voter survey that a majority of 
the voters understood that even a victorious KPU would not have enough 
seats in Parliament to form the Government. At least the two urban 
elections, it is-very possible that KANU victories reflected popular 
ft 
In this paper the author has used the following definition of.political 
integration; that political integration refers to the degree of 
consensus among politically oriented groups and their leaders on 
fundamentals of policy and to the degree of shared willingness to accept 
and participate in a common structure of rights, duties, powers, benefits, 
and constraints. 
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appreciation that the solutions to social and economic problems could 
come only from the Government whether or not people thought the Govern-
ment had made any progress so far. Similarly voting for KPU may well 
have been governed as much by existing personal ana ethnic loyalties as 
disapproval of the government's record since Independence. What is not 
clears therefores is the political response of the urban electorate to 
the Government's nation .building record since independence and whether 
the urban.electorate was to any extent voting on the basis of its social 
and economic condition-rather than ethnic and personal allegiances. 
In the absence of a - voter survey to clarify these built-in 
ambiguities, the problems of political integration in the urban con-
stituences as brought to light by the Little General Election can only 
be illuminated by examination of the local political structures within 
which the contests took place: and through analysis of the issues as presented 
by the candidates. The local leadership battles reflected the problems for 
political integration caused by shifting ethnic proportions} major policy 
questions5 and the social and economic conditions of the cities' inhabitants. 
The structure of local political leadership is relevant to the declared 
intention of the national KANU leadership to organize the party as an 
effective instrument of communication between the people and the central 
1 
government. The policy issues discussed in the campaign lay bare some 
of the major dilimmas of achieving economic and social progress in a less 
developed country, and the implications of this progress for political 
integration. 
A. Social and Economic Background 
The development of both Nakuru and Nairobi East has been heavily 
influenced by the circumstances of the surrounding,rural areas. Before 
Independence Nakuru was dependent upon the prosperity of the surrounding 
European farmers and was the acknowledged if unofficial capital of the 
European agricultural community. The headquarters of the Kenya Farmers 
Associationand the Kenya National Farmers'• Union, in the pa:st' the principal 
European farming organizations3 have been in Nakuru.. Many of the leading 
European politicians of recent times have been large scale farmers.in the 
Nakuru area.' Among them have been the present Minister for Agriculture, 
Bruce McKenzie; Sir Michael Blundell3 formerly Minister for Agriculture 
and leading spokesmen of the more liberal section of the European 
community before Independence; J. F. Pollard, a recent president of 
the KIJFUand Lord Delamere, sen of the celebrated pioneer European 
settler and also a recent president of the KNFU. 
The approach of Independence produced great uncertainty and 
insecurity among the European farmers both for their property rights and 
for their farming future in the country- These fears were exacerbated 
by protracted negotiations with the British Government for finance to 
carry out a transfer of European farms to African smallholders , causing 
the incumbent farmers to rear the loss of a market for their land. 
Development in these farms diminished and, with it, employment. Moreover 
since the transfer started, new African farmers have been hindered by bad 
growing seasons and an apparent shortage of credit which has not helped 
the unemployment figures. Nakuru town, being dependent on the rural 
economy, has been severely tried by these developments. In particular, 
the town has had to deal with the increase in unemployment resulting 
from difficulties in both the urban and rural sectors. Although there 
appears to be evidence that Nakuru is on the way to recovery, the recent 
political developments in the town must be seen against the background 
of a sagging economy and the consequent social distress. 
Most job holders resident in Nairobi East are employed in the 
city proper, although a minority work on nearby rural estates. Hence, the 
city is fundamentally more urban in its outlook than Nakuru. The con-
stituency forms part of the area to which Africans were relegated in pre-
Independence days when residential areas of the city were segregated by 
law. The poverty of Nairobi East and the other largely African suburbs 
contrasts with the thriving modern sector of the city supported in large 
measure by affluent residents of western Nairobi and the tourist 
business. Much of the commercial and industrial economy of the city is 
in Asian and European hands, witnessing the economic pre-eminence these 
groups maintained in colonial Kenya. This pre-eminence is now a 
major target of the campaign for Africanization, On the other hand5 
this constituency has been invaded by ve^y large numbers of work seekers 
from Central Province partly as a result of land consolidation which 
appears to have displaced numbers of rural tenant farmers, and partly as 
a result of the lifting of Emergency regulations in 1950 when large numbers 
of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru began to drift into the city. These immigrants 
have increased the already serious problems of poverty, residential over-
crowding, inadequate sanitation, and insufficient educational and medical 
facilities. There is a continuing conflict between the Council and these 
new residents, for the council insists on condemning and destroying for 
health reasons the temporary huts these people set up on arrival for 
residential and trading purposes. 
The large influx of poor and unemployed people has been a factor 
of major political as well as economic significance for both Nakuru and 
Nairobi East. A very large percentage of the new arrivals appear to have 
been Kikuyu, producing a substantial shift in the ethnic balances of both 
cities. When the last census was taken in 1962, the Kikuyu numbered 
about 40% of both constituencies, while the Luo and Luhya made up another 
35% in both. 10% of the population of Nakuru was Kalenjin while a similar 
percentage of Kamba were to be found in Nairobi . In Nakuru, unlike Nairobi 
East, there were and still are, a significant number of Asian and a smaller 
2 
number of European residents . Resulting from the population influx the 
Kikuyu have probably significantly enlarged their plurality in both towns. 
However, the last voter registration was also taken in 1962, and it was 
these lists that were used in the Little General Election. A great many 
of these new residents, rather than going home to vote, appear to have 
remained disenfranchised urban voters. The effect of this group on the 
campaigns is another imponderable of the election. They may or may not 
have contributed to the appearance of apathy during the campaign, and 
their social and economic straits may or may not have generated sympathy 
for KPU among the urban poor who could vote. What is fairly clear, however, 
is the impact of this group on the leadership struggles which have developed 
in Nairobi and Nakuru. Mwangi Mbogo Karungaru, the new KANU MP for 
Nairobi East, probably benefitted in his campaign from long association 
with the Kirinyaga Welfare Association organized to assist the newly arrived 
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Kikuyu, Embu,and Meru- In iTakuru, public charges and counter-charges have 
made "tribalism" a major issue. Mark Mwithaga could not but benefit from 
the influx of Kikuyu in his drive for political leadership. 
3. ... Development in the.KANU Branches 
The leadership struggle at the national level which precipitated 
the formation of KPU and the holding of the Little- General Election has 
been interwoven with leadership contests in local Nakuru and Nairobi 
politics. These.contests reflected the threat to political integration 
posed by the tensions "nc-n^  . the leading national politicians, the shifting 
ethnic balance of the cities, major.policy questions,;as well as the social 
and economic condition of the cities' inhabitants. 
Nairobi has been a KANU stronghold since the party's formation in 
1960, but its political unity has been forestalled by the continuing 
rivalry of factions which -have become identified with Tom Mboya and Oginga 
2. A , 
Odinga. Mboya built his political strength in the late 1950's on the trade 
union movement and the Nairobi-based People's. Convention P-?rty. His main 
rival, in the days of district level-only political parties was not Odinga 
but C. M. G. Argwings Kodhek, who led the African District Congress. The 
position, of all these leaders was made vulnerable by the exile in detention 
of Kikuyu political leaders and the exclusion of all Kikuyu, Ernbu, and 
Meru from political activity except those registered as Loyalists. The 
re-entry of the Kikuyu into politics after 1960 inevitably made the 
existing nationalist leadership suspect on tribal grounds. . Their return, 
as Mboya put it, "necessarily raised the question whether recognition of 
the old leaders meant discarding all the others'who had also made a 3 
contribution to the nationalist effort, and brought the country so far." 
But Nairobi, while ethnically diverse, had been a center for Kikuyu 
political activity. Hence Mboya's position was vulnerable not only as 
part of the new nationalist leadership but also in Nairobi which was his 
political base. 
It is one of the ironies of recent Kenya political history that 
while many leaders, both exiled and non-exiled, took steps to reconcile 
those of their number who had and had not been detained or restricted. 
the return of these exiled leaders itself produced a lasting division 
within the existing non exiled nationalist leadership of the day. Both 
Odinga and Mboya tried to unify these two streams of African nationalism 
3A 
and in the process became the leaders of competing- political camps. 
Confusion over whether the•exiled leadership was to replace the non-exiled 
leadership, or vice versa, or whether the two could be fused, created 
ambiguities on crucial ideological and policy issues, such as land, that 
lasted until positions were crystallized in the Little Gefieral Election. 
The emerging rivalry of leaders at the national level was felt 
almost immediately at the local level in Nairobi where Odinga became 
identified with a faction seeking to displace or limit the leadership of 
Tom Mboya. Odinga accused Mboya of using his old PCP to divide the new 
Kenya African National Union. In September 1960 a contested election for 
Nairobi branch officials reflected the incipient factional struggle, F C 
enlarged by confusion ever election procedures. Odinga chaired a public 
meeting at which Munyua Waiyaki, a Kikuyu employed in the medical department 
since his return in 1957 from a five year study tour abroad, defeated 
Argwings-Kcdhek on a show of hands to become branch chairman. Argwings-
Kodhek successfully nominated leading trade unionist Clement Lubembe for 
the vice chairmanship but nevertheless complained that the elections had 
been pre-planned by unnamed officials. With the pivotal position of 
secretary undecided, Mboya interrupted the meeting to say that before the 
election for this post could take-place, the KANU executive council would 
have to decide whether public meetings were the appropriate venue for 5 
electing branch officials. Sammy Maina, who had-been previously elected 
secretary, resigned in response to accusation of tribalism in the elections. 
Eventually, the KANU executive confirmed all officers elected at the 5B public meeting after a meeting of sub-branch delegates. Waiyaki went on 
to use his position, with the support of Od.inga, to challenge Mboya in the 
5C 
1961 'Kenyatta' election, though Mboya managed to win easily. This 
meeting and the subsequent general'election indicated the emergence of 
a local anti-Mboya 'faction in which Waiyaki and later KPU candidate 5D J.D. Kali were.leading, figures,, a' faction which was backed by Odinga. 
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In the background was the issue of land policy. .A KANU 'Ginger Group1 
advocating the expropriation of land and the banning of foreign invest-
ment was strong enough in Nairobi to draw denunciation from both Mboya 
a „ " 5E and Sammy Mains. 
In the interval between the 1961 and 1963 general elections, the 
migration of the Kikuyu from Central Province into the city shifted the 
ethnic balance substantially. Welfare associations which were.formed to 
deal with the social and economic plight of these predominantly poor 
immigrants began to become political or, at least, were seen as a political 
threat by the Luo and other groups. In July 1962,.even the KANU branch 
chairman of the day Christopher Kiprotich, openly denounced the alleged 
political activities of the Kikuyu welfare associations for their supDOsed 
divisive effect on Nairobi politics. One month later, members of the 
old PCP and the old ADC participated in the formation of the Luo Political 
. . 6A Union. Neither Mboya nor Argwings-Kodhek were among its leaders. Meanwhile 
Peter Okondo, Nairobi KADU Chairman, called upon the Luo to withdraw from 
KANU because of the latter's alleged association with the Land Freedom Army , 7 
whose policy was reflected in its name. Thus the policies pursued by 
Odinga and Mboya nationally were both to some extent undermined by the 
tendency of local politicians to respond in tribal terms to the re-entry 
of the Kikuyu into politics in Nairobi. In the background lay the difficult 
economic and social conditions cf the city's African sector. A public 
appeal was made to the Mayor by a KANU sub-branch chairman to do something 
7 A 
about the rise in rents and the inadequate health and sanitary conditions. 
This pattern of politics in Nairobi continued through the 1963 
general election to the present Little General Election. In 1963 the 
parliamentary candidates from Nairobi on the KANU ticket had become fairly 
easily identifiable with either Odinga or Mboya. Among the Odinga 
supported candidates were Dr. Waiyaki, who ran successfully in Nairobi 
North East and become Odinga's assistant minister in the Vice-President's 
Office, and J. D. Kali who was to resign from KANU three years later to 
join Odinga in KPU and attempt to retain his Nairobi East seat. The 
others who ran successfully in Nairobi in 1963 have all maintained their 8 
loyalty to the party and retained whatever posts they held. 
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Just before the 1963 election Waiyaki and Kali, identified as a faction 
by Mboya publicly, tried unsuccessfully to regain control of the Nairobi 
8A 
branch . The attempt took place in an atmosphere charged by accusations 
of tribalism. While Mboya and Odinga were prime movers in groups within 
KANU which were neither of one tribe nor uniformly either former freedom 
fighters or undetained leaders, Sammy Maina was threatening to use the 8D 
KANU youth wing to break up Kikuyu and Luo caucuses in the branch elections. 
The problem of tribal feeling was underlined by John Keen's warning that 
dissident Kikuyu politicians might undermine even the President's leadership. 
An important difference between Nairobi and Nakuru is the absence in 
the latter of any national leader with a base of support comparable to 
Mboya's, Waiyaki's or Odinga's. The efforts of national leaders to prevent 
changes in the ethnic balance, or other similar divisions, from dominating 
the campaign or the results, were perhaps more successful in Nairobi than 
in Nakuru . The background of the two constituencies differs in other ways. 
Nakuru has been a two party city, while 1<ADU never remotely challenged KANU 
in Nairobi . The ethnic base has shifted toward a larger Kikuyu plurality in 
Nakuru as in Nairobi, but the impact has been sharper because the departure 
of European farmers in the area has removed the buffer that safeguarded the 
Kalenjin peoples of the Rift Valley from the expansion of the Kikuyu from their 
heavily populated areas. The buffer zone included Nakuru and its removal in 
the surrounding area, has undoubtedly had an impact on Nakuru politics where 
a small but significant Kalenjin minority exists beside the Kikuyu 
plurality. The land issue has been sharpened by significant representation 
in Nakuru and the surrounding area of Land Fieedom Army and forest fighters 
elements to a greater extent than in Nairobi . The presence of such groups 
in Nakuru has drawn public warnings from local and national political 
leaders against disruptive activities on their part, but no suca a warning 
have been heard with reference to Nairobi. Finally, Nakuru, unlike Nairobi, 
is engaged in industrial competition with other emerging municipalities, 
notably Thika, and this has given special meaning to the campaign of local 
political figures for more economic development and social services . 
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As in Nairobi, KANU in Nakuru has been divided by factional 
struggles from the s'tart1. 'Mr. Mboya hoped to prevent Luo and Kikuyu from 
capturing all the urban seats in the 1961 general election, and sought 
. . . 10 •nomination of a candidate from a different ethnic group in Nakuru. 
Initially, there appeared to be agreement on the president of the old 
Nakuru African District Congress, Richard Kuboka. Whatever agreement had 
been obtained quickly dissolved. Kuboka dropped out of the picture 
completely and no less than three factions in Nakuru KANU ran candidates 
under the party banner. There were allegations that the three candidates 
each had a champion in the National party in the form of James Gichuru, 
it' 
Mboya, or Odinga. In the circumstances Wafula Wabuge of KADU won with only 
30% of the vote.' "In 1963 KANU achieved what subsequently proved to be 
temporary unity behind Achieng-Oneko. It is hard to say how this 
collaboration was achieved, but it might have been assisted by Oneko's 
close association with both Odinga and Mr. Kenyatta, and by his apparent 
limited involvement in previous party factional strife. Despite KANU's 
unity, KADU proved stronger in 1963 than in 1961 as incumbent 'Wabuge lO^ -
gathered a higher percentage of an enlarged total vote while losing to Oneko. 
The disunity within KANU Nakuru in 1961 general election was but 
a prologue to renewed struggles after independence. These were heightened 
and complicated by ethnicity, land and economic difficulties, and the 
changing relationship at the national level among leaders of KANU, KADU 
and what was to become KPU. The branch elections in 1964 indicated the 
impact of Kikuyu- and of Land Freedom Army on the Nakuru political scene. 
The assistant Minister for Labour and member for'Nakuru East, Fred Kubai, 
who was himself detained long years with Kenyatta, felt called upon to 
condemn political activities led by people he identified as former members 
of the LFA, Kamau Maithori, Kiama Kia Muingi, and other similar protest 
groups. Their activities were 'described as"subversive and tantamount to 
treason" and they were alleged to: be attempting to seize control of the 11 . . 
branch as well as to overthrow the- existing KANU leadership. Similar 
criticism came from Stephen Ogondi, Deputy Mayor of Nakuru' and an 
influential figure in Nakuru politics for several years . He expressed 
anxiety over the possible domination of local politics by one tribe. 
1 iu -
presumably the numerically predominant Kikuyu3 and the presence in this 
group of LFA members who in his judgement were particularly anxious to 
12 
control politics in Nakuru. 
The changes in the ethnic balance of Nakuru may have been one 
factor in a remarkable display of local independence in the branch elections 
of 1954. In this election, not only Kubai but two of the three other MP's 
from the area were defeated for election to branch offices. Anong the 
vanquished in addition to Kubai were H.J. Onamu, an assistant minister 
and member for Nakuru West, and Wasonga Sijeyo, the then Senator for 
Nakuru. Only Achieng-Oneko, of the MP's, was able to secure election. 
Whether or not the political tension created by ethnic changes was a factor 
in the defeat of Kubai and the other MP's, the election .demonstrated again 
the point that the national politicians were weak in local politics. ' 
Furthermore, since Onamu was defeated for the chairmanship, by Gathog-o 
Mwitumi who later joined Oneko and Sijeyo in opposition, the election 
d.-ncnstrited either thrt the future KANU-KPU factions had not yet fully 
crystallized or that neither was yet in position to monopolise local-
posit ions . 
The crucial events of 1964- were the reorganization of KANU in 
the Rift Valley including Nakuru and the resulting emergence, in local 
opposition, of Sijeyo and Oneko who were to help form KPU a year later. 
With the support of the national KANU leadership, the. former national 
chairman of. KADU and future Kenya Vice President, D. T.. Moi, was elected 
to lead the reorganization of KANU in the Rift Valley. Mark Mwithaga, who 
had long been active in Nakuru politics and who was later to defeat Oneko 
in the Little General Election, was chosen to be Hoi's principal aide in 
this task. 
Moi's election strengthened the hand of KANU leaders, national 
and local, such as Kubai and Ogondi who wished to prevent the insurgence 
of former freedom fighters and Land Freedom Army leaders from disrupting 
the political structure of the area. He had on several occasions publicly 
13 
warned against excesses by these groups. His election also was ' 
instrumental in the process of integrating - into KANU the Rift Valley 
peoples who had formerly supported KADU. Similarly,. Mwithaga's 
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selection to assist in the task of integrating within KANU the diverse 
strands of Kenya nationalism., represented in the Rift Valley and Nakuru 
in particular, seemed to give national backing to his subsequent drive to 
gain control of the local branch and eventually to become the MP for 
Nakuru town. 
The existing leadership of the Nakuru branch, led by Mwitumi, 
immediately and unsuccessfully challenged both the reorganization procedures 
and the subsequent attempt Df Mwithaga to capture the branch chairmanship. 
The rural Elburgon sub-branch passed a resolution of confidence in Bildad 
Kaggia, future Deputy President of KPU, who had already lost his assistant 
Ministership and fallen out of favor with KANU and the Government nationally 
Oneko reacted to the reorganization plan by holding a meeting of the Nakuru 
town sub-branch to confirm its existing officers in power for two years, 
thus to prevent reorganization from entailing recomposition of the local 
H P leadership in his own constituency. Mwitumi, for his part, accused 
Mr. Mboya of personnally selecting the Rift Valley KANU leadership and of 
14-trying to engineer a change m the local leadership from above. Mr. Moi 
responded by publicly criticising his fellow minister, Oneko, for his 
15 
action and accusing him of showing disloyalty to the President. Mwitumi 
suggested that Mr. Moi and Mr. Mboya should speak for the themselves rather 
than implicating the President. 
The reorganization effort involved a new attempt by the national 
leadership to regulate the political gyrations of the local party branch. 
The attempt to do so brought Oneko into open opposition to central party 
headquarters, supported by Mwitumi and Sijeyo. A great deal of political 
tension was generated by this conflict, which came to focus in the branch 
elections in July and subsequent municipal council elections. In May, the 
acting Mayor found it necessary to call a meeting of all local political 
and municipal leaders, together with representatives of the KANU Youth 
Wing, and Mr. Oneko to iron out what he called "tensions in the town"."1"^  
By this he was referring to the growing crisis of leadership within the 
local KANU branch. The personal and factional revalries were supported 
by ideological conflict over whether free land should be made available 
to the needy and whether anything was being done to relieve the general 
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poverty and lack of progress in the town. Police armed with tear-gas 
grenades witnessed the Nakuru town sub-branch elections where chairman 
Mwitumi and the other officers were defeated by Kimunya Kamana, chief rent 
collector (I), David Sakali and Richard Kiplel, both of whom had been 
I K p 
officials of the old KADU branch in Nakuru. Mwithaga and Mwitumu engaged 
in a heated debate over whether the elections had been democratic, an 
argument which the subsequent branch meeting resolved in Mwithaga's favor 
who thought that they had been fair elections. The branch also elected 
Mwithaga to replace Mwiturai as branch chairman; Fred Kubai and H. J. Onamu 
rejoined the branch leadership as vice chairman and assistant treasurer. 
Oneko lost his post as treasurer though, to his credit, he promised continued 
• •. K.n 
support for the branch. The consensus was that the one faction, which had 
been defeated a year earlier, had now completely triumphed, and the results 
appeared to re-establish the position of .-the national party figures based 
in Nakuru. Onamu held a big feast on his farm to celebrate the results . 
The reorganized KANU branch did not completely remove factional 
difficulties, however. In December 1965, KANU Nakuru refused to nominate 
one of its own sub-branch leaders, Richard Kiplel, for the municipal 
council. He and five other candidates for the nomination protested that 
tribalism had motivated the branch in its selections, and they all stood 
17 
as independents. Two of the six, not including Kiplel, managed to win 
election to the Council. In addition two other independents won in the 
Asian dominated central ward. Mwithaga accused the independents of 18 ' disloyalty to KANU and they in turn demanded the ouster of the present 
19 
KANU branch leadership. Stephen Ogondi, the Deputy Mayor who has been 
dubbed 'leader of the opposition' for his alleged support of independents 
said he maintained his support for the President and his Government while 
also continuing to oppose what he saw as the attempted monopolization of 20 
leadership posts by one tribe. Thus, on the eve of the emergence of 
KPU nationally, problems of ethnicity as well as economic and ideological 
difficulties continued to trouble the quest for political integration in 
Nakuru. 
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Q. ...Candidates and their Selection., 
In both constituencies, the KP.U candidates had formerly held 
positions of responsibility in the KANU government. Achieng-Oneko 
(Nakuru torn) .had been Minister for Information and Broadcasting and 
J .,D. Kali (Nairobi East) had been until mid-1955 the Party's Chief Whip 
in the House of Representatives. Furthermore9 both had long records of 
activity in the struggle for independence. Both had been very active in 
the pre-Emergency Kenya African Union led by .Kenyatta;• Oneko-had served 
as Chairman and as Secretary General in. the.years before.its dissolution. 
Both had been.detained during most of the.1950's. After the Emergency, 
Oneko,served as President Kenyatta's personal secretary until 1963 when 
he won the Nakuru seat. Consequently Oneko had strong.associations with 
Kenyatta as well as with Odinga whom he had served as manager of his Luo 
.Thrift and Trading Corporation. Kali, on the other hand, had travelled 
widely especially in South East Asia while in the Army and'this experience 
.plus his later visit to China seem to. have led him to share Odinga's 
ideological proclivity for the non-capitalist approach to development. 
Both men had been articulate as well as active participants in the nationalist 
cause- Oneko edited his own paper "Ramogi55 while Kali was a teacher and 
sometime editor of "Sauti mwa Afrika." 
The men who defeated Kali and Oneko in the Little General 
Election were distinguished by their records in local government and party 
organization. Mark Mwitnaga (Nakuru torn) is chairman of the Nakuru branch 
and had been, as noted above, very active in local politics for nearly 
10 years. Mwangi Mbogo Karungaru (Nairobi. East) is.an officer of 
both the Nairobi Branch and the Nairobi.East sub-branch ;and has been 
active in the local party since his release from detention. Mwithaga 
has been a member of the Nakuru Municipal Council since 1965 while 
Karungaru has been a clerk to the Nairobi City Council. 'Karungaru's 
local position is almost certainly enhanced by his leadership of the Kirinyaga 
Welfare Association which has tried to serve the needs of the great influx 
of people who have come to Nairobi, from Central Province since 1960. 
The new KANU representatives appear to have had stronger bases 
of local support than the men they defeated. In contrast to Mwithaga's 
long activity in Nakuru politics 5 Oneko has not been a long time resident 
-of the municipality. This plus the demands of his ministry during the 
•time when he held a' position in the local branch combined to prevent him 
from establishing a strong local base. His strength locally appears to 
have been based on the respect he commanded as a person and as a minister 
rather than on any real organizational strength. Mwithaga, in addition, 
probably profited from membership in the largest ethnic group. Kali and 
Karungaru had much the same liabilities and the same- advantages in back-
ground and their political careers might have been expected to follow a 
similar rather than a divergent course. Both are Kamba and share some 
disadvantage in being representatives of a minority ethnic group in Nairobi. 
Both were detained, however, and could have identified themselves with 
the Kikuyu in Nairobi who had been excluded from political activity during 
the 1950's. The two men have been rivals, however, and Kali as an incumbent 
has been defeated not once but three times by Karungaru in the last four 
years. In addition to the Little General Election, Karungaru twice 
defeated him for positions in the local branch. 
The explanation for Karungaru's apparently greater strength in 
local Nairobi politics would appear to derive from his choice of political 
tactics. Kali, along with Munyua Waiyaki, quickly became identified with 
a local faction that appeared to have Odinga's support. This local faction 
appears to have tried to use the Kikuyu's return to politics to dislodge the 
position that Mr. Mboya had built during the Emergency. Since only these 
two MP's,of the Nairobi representatives, appear to be in this group, it 
appears Kali in part failed simply because he chose the weaker group . On 
the other hand the Kirinyaga Welfare Association is apparently as open to 
both the new and the. old poor from Central Province and those who were 
detained as well as those who weren't. Karungaru's organization appears 
to have been more in keeping with the efforts of Mr. Mboya to build 
bridges between those who had and those who had not been detained in the 
19 50's. On ethnic grounds such a group might have become or have been 
perceived as a challenge to the existing leadership as hinted by the 
19S2 KANU Nairobi Chairman (above). Its aims, however, apparently have 
not been primarily political and perhaps for that reason has not threatened 
Mr. Mboya's position. Karungaru's selection as the candidate might in 
itself suggest that the KWA's aims were compatible with suopert rather 
than overthrow of the non exiled Nairobi KANU leadership. On the other 
hand when the KWA's leader becomes a candidate for political office, it 
is natural that such a group would be at least a passive base of support 
for him. Thus, while Kali became openly identified with a group whose 
tactics made it a relatively unsuccessful rival to Mr. Mboya's position, 
Karungaru in more quiet fashion became identified with a group whose 
purposes and tactics appeared to support the effort of the non-exiled 
KANU leadership in Nairobi to create political unity within the party. 
The process of candidate selection illustrated the concern of the 
national party leaders with the selection procedures, while the choices 
made from among would-be candidates demonstrated that candidates of local 
reputation with active records in KANU branches were chosen from a group 
that included several people with some claim to national prominence. 
The candidates were selected at meetings which included representatives 
of each ward in the case of Nairobi and each sub-branch in the case of 
Nakuru. At both meetings the KANU Vice President for the area presided 
without voting at the meetings. There was a report, however, that Mr. Moi 
persuaded several candidates to stand down in Nakuru in the interests of 
22 
party unity. In Nairobi, the announcement that branch officials would 
attend the meeting caused a misunderstanding between the Nairobi East 
sub-branch and Mr. Sammy Maina, the branch secretary. The former feared 
that they would be under-represented in the selection process and that a 
0 3 candidate might be imposed on the meetin-.^ Maina made it clear that Mr. 
Oh 
Kibaki -and the branch officials would supervise but would not vote." ' 
In each case the field of would-be candidates included people 
with some influence or prominence nationally. In Nakuru, Mr. Kenyatta's 
personal secretary — the job Oneko held before his election in 1963 — 
tried unsuccessfully to get the nomination. In Nairobi, three notables 
were initially in the field of 27 candidates and all withdrew. 
These included Margaret Kenyatta, daughter of the President, who was 
formerly in the Kenya U.N. delegation, the Mayor of Nairobi, Alderman 
Charles Rubia;, and the KANU National Executive Officer, Mr. John O'Washika, 
The reasons for these withdrawals remain in the realm of surmise and rumour. 
Mr. O'Washika may well have been persuaded that he would be more valuable to 
the party in his present position. On the other hand, there was an unsub-
stantiated report that the Mayor might contest one of the Nairobi seats in 
the 1958 general elections, since delayed until 1970. Both branches made 
it clear that a "local man;t was preferable to an outsider, and in Nairobi 
this seems to have figured in the preference shorn Karungaru over the man 
believed to have been his nearest rival, Wilson Mukuna. Mukuna, prominent as 
treasurer of the Confederation of Trade Unions and General Secretary of the 
Printing and Kindred Trades Workers' Union, is a resident of Nairobi but not 
of the Nairobi East constituency. 
D. The Issues and the Campaign. 
Without a survey of voter attitudes it is necessary to deal with the 
issues of the campaign from the standpoint of the candidates and the party 
leaders and to consider how the issues as presented related to problems of 
political integration. It must be repeated that the impact of the issues on 
voting behavior in this election is problemmatical since, as KANU pointed out, 
even a 100% KPU victory would not give them the Darliamentary strength to 
determine government policy. KPU could only counter this by asking the voters 
to think in terms of the next general election, then scheduled for 1968, when 
KPU could compete as an alternative government. In this campaign, therefore, 
there were issues not only of policy but also of strategy: whether it made 
sense to vote for an opposition which could protest but- could not immediately 
change the KANU government's policies. 
The urban campaigns gave a public airing to the leadership struggles 
which had simmered within KANU since well before independence. Both Mr. 
Odinga and Mr. Kaggia were at pains to explain the political as well as 
the policy reasons, as it were, why they decided to form an opposition 
party. For Mr. Odinga, the reason was his increasing estrangement 
from the President beginning with his failure to ret a ministry in the 
pre-independence government because of his views.on land policy. This 
estrangement was widened by the representations of western governments 
which he alleged had brought the President under neo-colonial influence 
and away from the political and economic ideology he and Mr. Kenyatta 
. . 25 were originally supposed to have shared. Mr. Kaggia complained that 
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former KADU leaders had now taken over places in the KANU hierarchy. 
Both these explanations confirm the reality, of the national leadership 
struggle which, as we have seen^was closely connected with similar 
contests at the local level that became explicit somewhat earlier. KPU 
was careful in these campaigns to make clear that they were not opposed 
to President Kenyatta personally., however,. but to those around him by 
whom he had allegedly been mislead. Indeed. Mr. Oneko in his resignation 
statement was particularly anxious to affirm his continuing regard for 
a 
the President^ In this respect the urban campaigns seem to have been 
somewhat different from those in Central Nyanza. 
Among the policy issues of the campaign, four dominated meetings 
in both urban constituencies: land, nationalization, social services, 
and non-alignment. On land, KPU took the line that land reforms to date 
had benefitted only relatively few Africans, although all Africans had 
fought for redress of injustices of land distribution during the struggle 
for Independence. Non-citizens, it was said, were still able to acquire 
land despite the apparent intentions of KANU on this subject. Odinga 
emphasized that it was over the land issue that he began to be isolated 27 
from the KANU government. KANU replied by drawing attention- to the 
threat of confiscation and nationalization, not only of rural land but 
of private property generally, which it found implicit in :the KPU 
program . KANU spokesmen thought the nationalization of private property 
implicit in the KPU program would turn the "whole of Kenya into one. 28 
vast labour camp."" The party, also asked the,country to remember that 
nearly 35,000 families were, being settled under a nearly completed. 
1,500,000 acre., land transfer-program. 
The significance of the land issue in the.urban contests lay 
in its relationship to the problem of urban unemployment. The government 
has said many times that it wants urban unemployed to "go back to the land. 
- 18 -
Though not much was said about this during the campaign itself, the 
policy has been voiced both before and since the election. The 
Development Plan 1966-70 states that the one of five men who reach working 
age during the next five years but do not find salaried jobs or self-
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employment are to be absorbed in the subsistence sector. There is 
some question as to whether the rural areas can re-ally absorb the urban 
unemployed. Both the new urban MP 's and a number of the others are on 
record as thinking that settlement schemes have not done enough to relieve 
the urban unemployed, as distinct from the rural unemployed and under-
employed for itfhom rural settlement schemes have obviously done a great deal. 
Karungaru has called for more consideration of Nairobi unemployed in the 
settlemtnt schemesi Mwithaga earlier produced a plan for improving undereloped 
land with urban unemployed who would acquire individual plots on such land 
as they developed after initial improvements had been made by them as a 
collective labor force. The problem is to prevent unemployment from being 
a political football to be kicked back and forth between urban and rural 
interests both of whom may be either unwilling or unable to make an effective 
contribution to its solution. 
The questions of nationalization and provision of social services 
can be treated together. The thrust of KPU's argument was that social 
services to urban residents have been inadequate* medical and educational 
familities are inadequate and too expensive in their view, and they thought 
the Kenya Bus Service and the East African Power and Lighting Company had 
been inefficient. The latter they felt was over-staffed with expatriates. 
KPU thus tried to link insufficient social services with their fundamental 
argument that the government served only the interests of the affluent 
and that the root of the problem is the continued presence of foregin 
interests in crucial places to the detriment of the society. To this 
KANU replied that KPU's solution of free things and nationalization 
provided no answers. The root of the problem, they said, was production 
and economic growth which nationalization per se would not achieve: 
specifically, nationalization of E.A.P.& L. would not yield very much 
provit for allocation to social services since KANU did not believe in 
expropriation and would have to pay off the owners. 
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The dissatisfaction with the distribution of advantages which 
motivated KPU's protest clearly suggests that political integration 
might be endangered by the. emergence of sharp and antogonistic economic 
classes arising out of economic development. The African Socialism policy 
of the KANU Government recognizes this danger and pledges the Government to 
the task of minimizing the. political ill-effects of the emergence of, 
economic classes and where.possible it would limit the development of 
such classes. The issue of the Little General Election in the urban areas 
was whether the. problems of the urban poor had reached proportions of 
enough significance to fracture the political consensus which KANU had 
attempted to create and maintain since taking power. 
It wo.ujd be worthwhile to gauge the effect of the non-alignment 
debate on the degree of political integration in the urban areas. Each 
party claimed to adhere to a policy of true non-alignment and decried the 
alleged hypocrisy of the other for not practicing its principles. Each' 
accused the ether of serving and being supported by "foreign masters." 
In addition, KANU took the position that one revolution, great though' it 
was,, is enough. It suggested that those who really knew about thei 
revolutionary societies' of the East would not be so enthusiastic over their 
promise, as KPU was., alleged to be. There was not, however, and could not 
have been any implication from either side that the candidates had not 
participated fully in the nationalist struggle in Kenya, since all 
obviously had records of dedicated political activism. 
The danger of such a debate lies in the possibility that 
alleged differences between parties in their international alignments 
could reinforce any ethnic or economic cleavage which separated the two 
parties . One possible criterion for a politically stable country might 
well be the existence of a political consensus on certain fundamentals 
and non-alignment might well be part of such a consensus. There might 
be an advantage to both parties and the country if both parties were, 
and could be seen to be, non-aligned to such a degree that the non-
alignment of each party could be • mutually taken for granted. 
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In assessing the impact of the personalities and issues of the 
campaign on t-he outcome, considerable attention would have to be given 
to the style;of the campaigns themselves. Nairobi had a predominantly 
peaceful campaign in which both sides had a fair number of election 
meetings, while Nakuru was the scene of considerable unrest in which 
several KPU meetings were stopped by police when parts of the crowd became 
unruly. Of the three large meetings scheduled by KPU one was broken up 
by police when a riot appeared in the offing and another had to be cancelled 
when it was learned that the President would address a rally in Nakuru the 
same day. Mr. Odinga was able to hold one large rally in the town two 
days before the election. In Nairobi, however, no meetings x^ ere broken 
up, though there was some unrest after the initial KANU rally where 
several ministers had spoken. At this meeting Mr. Mboya attacked the 
supporters of Odinga, alleged to be mainly Luo, whom he said spent their 
time behaving badly, sitting in bars "drinking beers and indulging in 
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fruitless .politics," and generally trying to create a tribal party. 
One reason for the difference in the campaigns might lie in the degree 
to which leading national, politicians maintain a strong basis of support 
in the constituencies. While Mboya has had a strong local base in Nairobi, 
no national figure has had any comparable position in Nakuru. Where national 
leaders are able to maintain strong positions, it is possible that their 
followers may be more easily kept from becoming unruly. 
E. Conclusions. 
KANU retained both the Nairobi East and Nakuru seats, but both 
contests were relatively closely fought in an election dominated, by one-
sided results. Such close elections might suggest threats to political 
integration that bear with particular force on urban areas. This study 
has, therefore- focused on certain problems posed for political 
integration which were brought to light by the election in these two 
cities: ethnic diversities, pre-Independence loyalties, economic class 
discrepencies, and unemployment, distribution of land and social services, 
and suspicions of international alignments. Since voters' perceptions 
of the campaign issues could not be assessed in the absence of any voter 
survey, these problems necessarily have been identified from the standpoint 
of the candidites and of the parties' leadership. 
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The departure of Mr. Odinga and other MP's from KANU in order 
to form KPU came as the climax of a leadership struggles fed by personality 
and policy clashes, that has simmered within KANU since its formation. 
The influence of the national leaders involved has been a factor in local 
leadership contests that have gone on simultaneously with that at the 
national level. This local leadership competition resulted in the isolation 
locally of .both the future KPU candidates from the urban constituencies 
nearly a year before they went into opposition nationally. 
The local leadership struggles in Nakuru and Nairobi have been 
influenced by the influx of Kikuyu into both areas and their re-entry 
into politics following the end of the Emergency in 1960. The tension 
produced by this influx on the pre-existing political structure has 
promoted warnings of tribalism which have had overtones relating to land 
polic}^  and the social and economic problems of the two cities. On the 
other hand the basis of the struggle at the national level appears to 
have been based, not on tension between the pre-1960 political elite and 
that which returned to action after 19 60, but on divisions within the pre-
1960 leadership, which nonetheless resulted from the re-entry of the Kikuyu 
into political life. The new urban KANU MP's, in addition to being men of 
substantial local reputation by comparison to their predecessors and many 
of the would-be nominees, seem to have played some part in implementing 
the attempt of KANU to weave into a single fabric the different strands 
of Kenya nationalism represented by former loyalists and freedom fighters, 
KANU and KADU, urban and rural dwellers, and different ethnic groups. 
This effort at political integration has been founded on a common endeavor 
for economic and social progress. The analysis of the campaign issues, 
however, indicates that this common task is itself beset by certain 
problems, such as the apparent emergence of economic classes and how 
to absorb the urban unemployed, that may adversely affect progress 
toward political integration. 
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f o o t n o t e d 
1. Mr. Mboya, speaking at Nakuru on 21st April 1966, said "In the years 
which led to Idependence, the role of the party was quite straight 
forward . It was to oppose the colonialist government and drive it from 
Kenya as quickly as possible. The task which now faces the party is much 
more subtle. The party has to be the instrument through which the 
government's policies arc brought to the people and through which the 
people are brought up to the government." East African Standard April 22, 
1966. 
2. Figures are derived from the Kenya Population Census 1962. Volume 1 was 
published by the Economics and Statistics Division of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning in 1964. Vol. II was published in 1965 by 
the same division as part of the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development. 
2A. The paper will indicate that the KPU candidate, Mr. Kali, and Dr. Waiyaki 
have been an identifiable splinter group associated with Mr. Odinga almost 
since 1960. See also East African Standard of January 26, 1961 and. 
January 5, 1963. 
3. Mboya, Tom Freedom and Aftey,London: Andre Deutsch, 1963. page 82. 
3A . The evidence for this is to be found in the fact that both KPU and KANU 
have among their leaders people representing those who were detainees and 
those who weren't as well as different ethnic groups,and political histories. 
3B. The East African Standard reported as early as November 11, 1960 that 
KANU's vagueness on land was a result of differences between Gichuru, 
Mboya, and Odinga., that became apparent the previous day at a public press 
conference. 
4. East African Standard April 6, 1960. 
5. East African Standard September 26, 1960 and October 14, 1960. 
5A. East African Standard October 14 1960. 
5B. East African Standard November 17 1960. 
5C. Results of this election, quoted in C. Rosberg and G. Bennett, the Kenyatta 
Election: Kenya 1960-1961 (London, Oxford University Press, 1963) page 
210 show that Mboya captured nearly 88% of the 35787 votes cast. 
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6. East African Standard July 23, 1962. 
6A. East African Standard August 20 1962. 
7. East African Standard October 17, 1962. 
7A. East African Standard December 14 1962. 
8. Dr. Waiyaki resigned his position as an Assistant Minister to Mr. Odinga 
in the Office of the Vice President, at nearly the same time as Odinga and 
the other MP's resigned from KANU to form KPU. Dr. Waiyaki did not, 
however, resign from KANU. 
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